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Mohamed T. Hegazi
COMMENT: To Be or Not to be Detained: A Discussion on Why Reinstated Removal Orders
During Withholding-Only Proceedings Are Not Administratively Final
Introduction
Each year, thousands of noncitizens are apprehended for entering the country illegally.1
Of the noncitizens that are apprehended, many of them are removed from the United States, with
over 65,000 removals occurring in 2016 and over 81,000 removals occurring in 2017.2 Upon
apprehension, a noncitizen is often placed in removal proceedings where an immigration judge
decides whether he or she can remain in the country.3 Many noncitizens are also removed from
the country immediately upon apprehension without having such proceedings, reflecting
Congress’s desire to reduce illegal immigration.4 Regardless of how a noncitizen is removed,
there is no guarantee that he or she will not attempt to re-enter the country at a later time.5 Thus,

1

Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92
IND. L.J. 157, 159 (2016). See also DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2016 Statistics, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Dec.
30, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/12/30/dhs-releases-end-year-fiscal-year-2016-statistics (stating that the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) apprehended 530,250 individuals in 2016); Fiscal Year 2017 ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T 1, 13 (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf (stating that the United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) “conducted 143,470 overall administrative arrests” in 2017).
2
Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, supra note 1 at 12.
3
Gilman, supra note 1 at 159 (stating that “significant number of migrants in detention are awaiting the conclusion
of . . . deportation proceedings . . . which will determine” whether they may remain in the country).
4
Hillary Gaston Walsh, Forever Barred: Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66 CATH. U.L.
REV. 613, 620–24 (2017) (explaining “expedited removal” of noncitizens under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), which reflects “Congress’s goals of reducing illegal immigration”). Expedited Removal allows federal
officers to remove noncitizens “without a hearing before an immigration judge or review by the Board of
Immigration Appeals” (“BIA”). Kristen Macleod-Ball et al., Expedited Removal: What Has Changed Since
Executive Order No. 13767, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 2 (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/final_expedited_removal_advisor
y-_updated_2-21-17.pdf. While expedited removal was initially limited to “ports of entry” such as airports, it has
been expanded to apply to noncitizens apprehended within 100 miles of a border and who fail to prove that, at the
time of apprehension, they have been in the country for at least fourteen days. Lara Domínguez et al., U.S.
Detention and Removal of Asylum Seekers: An International Human Rights Law Analysis, YALE L. SCH. 1, 6 (June
20, 2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/schell/human_rights_first_-_immigration_detention__final_-_20160620_for_publication.pdf.
5
Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, supra note 1 (stating that “[of ICE’s arrests
for 2017], 92 percent had a criminal conviction a pending criminal charge, were an ICE fugitive or were processed
with a reinstated final order” (emphasis added)).
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special provisions are in place regarding the removal of noncitizens who re-enter the United
States after having been previously removed.6
When a previously removed noncitizen re-enters the country, and is subsequently
apprehended, his or her prior removal order is “reinstated from its original date.”7 This order is
referred to as a reinstated removal order.8 While the effect of the reinstated removal order seems
clear – the noncitizen must be removed from the country – noncitizens subject to such orders are
not always removed.9 This is because a noncitizen may express a reasonable fear of being
removed to the country listed in his or her prior removal order.10 The noncitizen may then
choose to apply for withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”), where he or she can avoid being
removed to that country through withholding-only proceedings.11
Whenever a noncitizen is apprehended for illegally entering the United States, a decision
is made as to whether he or she will be detained until his or her removal proceedings are
complete.12 In some instances, however, noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention, where
they are required to be detained during removal proceedings.13 For example, a noncitizen must

6

See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
Id. Noncitizens who re-enter the country illegally may, in addition to being removed from the United States, face
criminal charges for re-entering the country. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90
S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 203 (2017). Criminal charges, however, are not as common and tend to occur in those
jurisdictions close to the United States’s borders. Id.
8
See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2017) (referring to the 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(5) order as
a “reinstated removal order”); Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2016) (same).
9
This effect is based on §1231(a)(5)’s text, which provides that a noncitizen with a reinstated removal order “shal l
be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.” § 1231(a)(5). See FY 2015 Statistics Yearbook,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. A1, M1, K5 (Apr. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb15/download (providing
statistics on noncitizens avoiding removal pursuing relief though the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”) and § 1231(b)(3)).
10
See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 882; Guerra, 831 F.3d at 61.
11
See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 882; Guerra, 831 F.3d at 61.
12
Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92
IND. L.J. 157, 165 (2016)
13
See § 1231(a)(2) (providing that noncitizens, during removal periods, “shall” be detained by the Attorney
General).
7
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be detained if he or she previously committed an aggravated felony, multiple crimes involving
moral turpitude, or a crime involving a controlled substance.14 The District Courts, however,
have disagreed on whether noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders must be mandatorily
detained during withholding-only proceedings.15 While some have held that mandatory
detention is required, others have held that the noncitizens are at least entitled to bond hearings.16
Eventually, the issue reached the appellate courts.17 The Ninth and Second Circuits, however,
also disagreed and therefore created a circuit split as to whether noncitizens are subject to
mandatory detention during withholding-only proceedings.18
The current circuit split is due to the Ninth and Second Circuits’ disagreement on whether
reinstated removal orders are “administratively final” during withholding-only proceedings.19
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the orders are final because the only decision being made
during these proceedings is whether or not the noncitizen will be removed to the country listed
on the removal order.20 The court opined that because removing the noncitizen to other countries
remains a possibility during these proceedings, the decision to remove him or her from the
United States has already been made, thereby supporting its conclusion that the orders are final.21
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, opined that a judge during withholding-only proceedings
is solely concerned with determining whether a “[noncitizen] is to be removed from the United
States.”22 Thus, because the Court found that the decision to remove the noncitizen from the

14

See § 1226(c)(1)(B) (listing the instances where a noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention).
See Reyes v. Lynch, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114643, *4–5 n. 4–5 (D. Colo. 2015) (listing cases where courts are
split).
16
Id.
17
Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2017); Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2016).
18
Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886 (noncitizens subject to mandatory detention); Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64
(noncitizens entitled to bond hearings).
19
Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886; Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64.
20
Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886.
21
Id.
22
Guerra, 831 F.3d at 62 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).
15

4

country is not made until the proceedings are complete, the reinstated removal order cannot be a
final order.23
The current split has serious consequences for noncitizens, since a noncitizen’s detention
status largely depends on which court hears his or her case. Currently, a noncitizen will be
detained if his or her withholding-only proceedings occur within the Ninth Circuit, while he or
she will at least get a bond hearing if his or her case is brought within the Second Circuit.24 The
concern with this, of course, is the injustice that occurs if one of the appellate courts reached the
wrong decision. Because immigration proceedings are generally prolonged, it is possible that
some noncitizens will spend lengthy periods in detention when, legally, they were not required to
do so.25 Thus, the Supreme Court should act to resolve this split and bring uniformity to an issue
in law that has caused substantial disagreement among courts.26 In this comment, I argue that the
Second Circuit correctly concludes that the orders are not administratively final – thus, the
Supreme Court should adopt its reasoning and hold that the noncitizens are not subject to
mandatory detention.27 I first argue that from a practical standpoint, a reinstated removal order
cannot be final since it can affect the country of removal listed in the reinstated removal order. I
then argue that the Second Circuit’s reasoning is better aligned with Congress’s intent to avoid
removing noncitizens to dangerous countries. I last argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in

23

Id. at 64.
Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d 881, 890 (mandatory detention required); Guerra, 831 F.3d 59, 64 (noncitizen entitled
to bond hearing).
25
Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92
IND. L.J. 157, 160 (2016) (describing immigration proceedings in general as “lengthy” due to large dockets).
26
See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886 (concluding that the order is administratively final); Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64
(concluding that the order is not administratively final); Reyes v. Lynch, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114643, *4–5 n. 4–
5 (D. Colo. 2015) (listing numerous cases where the courts have split on the issue)
27
Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64.
24

5

Zadvydas v. Davis supports the conclusions that the noncitizens should not be mandatorily
detained.28
Part I of this comment provides background information on American immigration law
and an explanation of reinstated removal orders. Part II analyzes the reasoning of courts that
have decided on the administrative finality of reinstated removal orders during withholding-only
proceedings. Part III of this comment argues that the Second Circuit correctly concluded that the
reinstated removal orders are not administratively final during withholding-only proceedings and
how the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas is consistent with such a holding.
I.

Part I: A Description of American Immigration Law

Part I(A): Reinstated Removal Orders
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) is the centerpiece of American
immigration law.29 This is so because the INA governs various aspects of immigration law,
including the removal of noncitizens from the United States.30 One of the INA’s provisions
governing the removal of noncitizens is 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(5), which is triggered whenever a
noncitizen reenters the country after being previously removed.31 When the reentering
noncitizen is apprehended, his or her prior removal order is “reinstated from its original date.”32

28

533 U.S. 678 (2001). Zadvydas concerned the detention of noncitizens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Id. at
682. The issue there was whether, under the statute, detention of “a removable alien indefinitely beyond” a removal
period within the statute is permissible. Id (alteration omitted). The Court concluded that indefinite detention is not
permissible. Id. at 697. The Court, in reaching its decision, focused on the point at which a noncitizen’s removal
from the country is foreseeable. Id. at 699–700 (providing that detention is impermissible when a noncitizen’s
removal is not reasonably foreseeable). While not speaking directly on the issue discussed in this note, the Court’s
emphasis on the foreseeability removal provides insight as to how the Court may decide the issue presented here.
Specifically, the Court may decide that a noncitizen’s detention status during withholding-only proceedings is
influenced by whether or not removal from the United States is reasonably foreseeable.
29
See REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (Am.
Immigration Lawyers Ass’n 6th ed. 2010) (explaining how the Immigration and Nationality Act forms the
foundation of American Immigration Law).
30
See Id. at 23 (noting how American immigration laws offered protection to those fleeing their countries for fear of
political persecution during the 19 th Century); see e.g. 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
31
§ 1231(a)(5).
32
Id.

6

Thereafter, the noncitizen is removed from the country.33 The timeframe for removing a
noncitizen pursuant to § 1231(a)(5) is generally short since noncitizens subject to reinstated
removal orders are barred from pursuing relief normally available under the INA.34
The process of entering a reinstated removal order against a noncitizen is governed by 8
C.F.R. § 241.8.35 Unlike a noncitizen who illegally enters the United States for the first time, a
noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order is not entitled to a hearing before an immigration
judge.36 Instead, a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) officer must make certain
determinations before the reinstated removal order takes effect and removes a noncitizen.37
Included among these required determinations is a determination on whether the noncitizen fears
returning to his or her home country.38 This determination is important because an exception to
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)’s general ban on relief lies in the noncitizen’s ability to pursue relief under
the CAT or withholding of removal pursuant to §1231(b)(3) if he or she professes such a fear.39
The noncitizen would pursue such relief through a withholding-only proceeding.40 This avenue
of relief exists for noncitizens because the government cannot remove noncitizens to countries
where they will be persecuted or tortured.41

33

Id.
Id.; Hillary Gaston Walsh, Forever Barred: Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66 CATH.
U.L. REV. 613, 625 (2017). The process of removing noncitizens can even take as little as a few hours. Koh, supra.
note 7 at 205.
35
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8; Trina Realmuto, Practice Advisory: Reinstatement of Removal, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL1, 9
(Apr. 29, 2013),
https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/gen/2013_29Apr_reinstate removal.pdf (providing an overview of the process in which a reinstated removal order is entered against an alien).
36
§ 241.8(a).
37
Realmuto, supra. note 35 at 9. These determinations include whether the noncitizen is subject to a previous order
of removal, what the identity of the alien is, and whether the alien did in fact enter the United States illegally. §§
241.8(a)(1) – (2).
38
Realmuto, supra. note 37 at 9 (citing §§ 208.31; 241.8(e)).
39
Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 831–32 (9th Cir. 2016).
40
Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 205 (2017).
41
Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F. 3d 59, 61 (2d. Cir. 2016) (first citing 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3); then citing 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)). See also Koh, supra. note 40 at 205.
34
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Part I(B): The Law’s Treatment of Noncitizens Fearing Return to Their Home Countries
Throughout history, millions of people have sought to escape dangerous conditions in
their home countries with hopes of finding refuge in foreign nations.42 The United States,
unsurprisingly, has long been a popular destination for refugees, with around three million
refugees residing in the country since 1980.43 For the United States, this popularity has at times
led to a particular immigration problem – in some instances, a noncitizen enters the country
illegally with hopes of finding refuge.44 Of course, any noncitizen who enters the country
illegally, regardless of whether or not he or she seeks refuge, runs the risk of being removed.45
Removing noncitizens, however, has its limits, as the United States is barred from removing any
noncitizen to a country where he or she reasonably fears for his or her life.46 When a noncitizen
faces removal pursuant to § 1231(a)(5), the INA, the CAT, and the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) all play a role in his or her removal.47
The United States has certain obligations to noncitizens because of its obligations under
the CAT, the Protocol and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Convention”).48 The Protocol precludes its signatories from removing noncitizens to countries

42

Examples include the thousands of refugees who fled persecution in their home countries after World War II, and
more recently, the millions of Syrian citizens who fled Syria to escape the dangerous conditions posed by its civil
war. See REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (Am.
Immigration Lawyers Ass’n 6th ed. 2010); The Syrian Refugee Crisis and its Repercussions for the EU, EUROPEAN
U. INST. (Sept. 2016), http://syrianrefugees.eu.
43
See Jens Manuel Krogstad and Jynnah Radford, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 30,
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/.
44
See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2017) (noncitizen fearing persecution and torture in his
home country of El Salvador); Guerra 831 F. 3d at 61 (noncitizen with a reasonable fear of returning to Guatemala).
45
See e.g. Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T
1, 11–12 (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf
(providing statistics on inadmissible noncitizens removed from the United States).
46
Germain, supra. note 42 at 24; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
47
See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d 881 and Guerra, 831 F.3d 59 for examples of cases where reinstated removal
of aliens were delayed due to the United States’s CAT obligations and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
48
Germain, supra. note 46 at 8, 24.
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where their lives would be placed in danger.49 After becoming bound by the Protocol’s
provisions, the United States passed the Refugee Act in 1980 to better align its immigration laws
with its obligations under the Protocol.50 The Refugee Act accomplished this goal by
incorporating into the INA the Protocol’s definition of refugee and the principle of
nonrefoulement.51 Thus, under the INA, a noncitizen who fears that his or her “life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of . . . [his or her] race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” can avoid removal by applying for
statutory withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3)(A).52 The United States is also a signatory
to the CAT, which prevents the government from removing any noncitizen to any country where
he or she will likely be tortured.53 Therefore, noncitizens fearing a return to their home countries

49

Id. at 24. The United States is also bound by United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Convention”), because the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) amended the
Convention to broaden the range of individuals who can seek relief, while keeping most of the Convention’s
provisions intact. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, OFF. UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1, 2, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf. Thus, because of these international
law obligations, the United States “shall [not] return or expel . . . a refugee . . . to a territory where he or she fears
threats to life or freedom.” Id. at 3.
50
Germain, supra. note 49 at 24
51
Id. The Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) definition of refugee is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42),
which defines a refugee as “any person [outside his or her country of nationality] . . . who is unable or unwilling to
return to [that country] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The INA’s nonrefoulement principle is
found in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), which provides that the “Attorney General may not remove a[ noncitizen] to a
country if the Attorney General decides that the [noncitizen’s] life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the [his or her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see Germain, supra. note 50 at 12 (referring to § 1231(b)(3) as the INA’s nonrefoulement
section).
52
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).
53
Germain, supra note 51 at 8; Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. Of Law’s Ctr. For Immigrant’s Rights, WithholdingOnly Proceedings, PENN ST. L. 1, 12, (Aug. 2014)
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Withholding-Only-Toolkit.pdf. The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”) is an international human
rights treaty formed by the United Nations in 1984. David Weissbrodt and Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 L. & INEQ. 343, 353 (2011). David Weissbrodt and Isabel Hortreiter,
The Principle of Nonrefoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparision with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International
Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). The CAT became effective law in the United States
in 1994. Germain, supra. note 53 at 8. Under The CAT, “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.” Id.

9

are not limited to relief through statutory withholding of removal, but may also apply for relief
under the CAT, so long as they fear being tortured in addition to being persecuted.54
For a noncitizen to obtain relief under the CAT or statutory withholding of removal, he or
she must express a fear of torture or persecution in his or her home country.55 Once the
noncitizen expresses such a fear, he or she is referred to an asylum officer who determines
whether his or her fear is reasonable.56 A noncitizen’s fear is reasonable if there is a “reasonable
possibility” that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal or “persecuted on account
of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion.”57 The INA does not define what acts constitute persecution.58 Therefore, the
determination of whether a noncitizen’s fear of persecution is reasonable is a fact-intensive
inquiry contingent upon the exact dangers the noncitizen fears.59 Consequently, courts have held
that various acts may constitute persecution, including forced abortions, sexual assault,
threatening peoples’ lives, and ethnic cleansing.60 With regards to a noncitizen’s fear of torture
in a country, a noncitizen must prove that he or she will be tortured by that country’s
government, or with that government’s acquiescence.61

54

See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2017) (noncitizen seeking statutory withholding of
removal and relief under the CAT through withholding-only proceedings); Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d
Cir. 2016) (same). Relief under the CAT includes deferral of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17 and withholding of
removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.
55
§241.8.; Hillary Gaston Walsh, Forever Barred: Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66
CATH. U.L. REV. 613, 630 (2017).
56
Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2016); Pa. State Univ., supra note 53 at 5.
57
§ 208.31(c).
58
Germain, supra note 53 at 33.
59
Id.
60
See e.g. Id. at 35 (citing Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004); then citing Wang v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003); then citing Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000); then citing
Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d. Cir. 1997)).
61
Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003). § 208.18(a)(1) defines torture as “any act by which
severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing him or her for an
act he or she or a third person has committed . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id. (emphasis
added). See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 1, 11–12 (2014).
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If the asylum officer finds that the noncitizen’s expressed fear of removal is reasonable,
the noncitizen is placed in withholding-only proceedings before an immigration judge.62 To
qualify for relief, the noncitizen must establish a “clear probability” of the threats he or she
claims to face.63 If the noncitizen successfully meets this burden, the United States cannot
remove the noncitizen to the country listed in the prior removal order.64 The immigration judge,
however, can remove the noncitizen to a third country, even if he or she decides that the
noncitizen cannot be removed to the country he or she fears for his or her life in.65
While noncitizens subject to removal are protected by the INA and CAT, the likelihood
of a noncitizen’s removal is high.66 Databases tracking the outcomes of withholding-only cases
show that, over the last two decades, “immigration courts have heard 10,105 withholding-only
cases,” almost all of which were recently heard.67 Final decisions were reached in nearly half
these cases, with 25.4% of those cases resulting in the noncitizen obtaining the right to remain in
the United States.68 Moreover, of these cases, the immigration courts granted a noncitizen’s
application for relief through statutory withholding of removal or relief through the CAT in only
1,105 cases.69 Thus, while a noncitizen seeking such relief is very likely to be removed from the
United States, relief is not entirely uncommon.

Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. Of Law’s Ctr. For Immigrant’s Rights, Withholding-Only Proceedings, PENN ST.
L. 1, 9 (Aug. 2014) https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Withholding-OnlyToolkit.pdf. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)).
63
Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). The “clear probability” standard has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court to mean that the noncitizen must prove it is “more likely than not” that he or she “would be
subject to persecution on one of the protected grounds.” Id. The “more likely than not” standard also applies when
noncitizens seek relief under the CAT. Id. at 1095.
64
Pa. State Univ., supra note 62 at (citing § 1231(b)(3)(A)).
65
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f).
66
David Hausman, Fact Sheet: Withholding-Only Cases and Detention, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 1, 2 (Apr. 19,
2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/withholding_only_fact_sheet_-_final.pdf.
67
Id. at 1.
68
Id. at 1–2.
69
Id. at 2.
62
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Part I(C): The INA and Detention of Noncitizens
Whenever a noncitizen is apprehended, federal officials must decide whether he or she
will be detained during his or her removal proceedings.70 The decision, of course, is contingent
upon which of the INA’s detention provisions the noncitizen is subject to.71 The INA contains
numerous provisions governing a noncitizen’s detention. For example, if a noncitizen is a
suspected terrorist, the INA requires that he or she be subject to mandatory detention pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226a.72 §1226a’s detention provisions, however, would not apply when a noncitizen
is being examined for diseases, physical or mental defects, or disabilities, since such a noncitizen
is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1222(a).73 And neither provision governs the detention of
noncitizens convicted of certain crimes, as these noncitizens are subject to detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c).74 The split between the Ninth and Second circuits focuses on only two of the
INA’s numerous detention provisions –§ 1226(a) and § 1231(a).75
§ 1231(a) applies when a noncitizen is ordered removed from the United States.76 Under
§ 1231(a), a noncitizen ordered removed from the United States must be removed within a
ninety-day period.77 This ninety-day period is referred to as the noncitizen’s “removal period.”78
During the removal period, the noncitizen must be detained, making § 1231(a) one of the INA’s
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mandatory detention provisions.79 When the removal period concludes, the government has
discretion to continue detaining the noncitizen pursuant to § 1231(a)(6).80 § 1226(a), on the
other hand, does not require that noncitizens subject to its provisions be mandatorily detained.81
Instead, § 1226(a) provides the government with discretion in determining whether a noncitizen
should be detained.82 Thus, the government may elect to release a noncitizen subject to §
1226(a)’s provision on bond.83
For a noncitizen facing detention, being detained pursuant to § 1226(a), as opposed to §
1231(a), is more appealing because of the availability of bond hearings.84 If a noncitizen is
going to be detained, he or she will be held at a detention facility.85 The problem detention poses
for noncitizens is that immigration detention facilities tend to have subpar conditions, and at
times are compared to criminal detention facilities.86 Moreover, immigration proceedings
generally tend to be prolonged, and withholding-only proceedings are no exception.87 As of
January 1st 2015, withholding-only proceedings where an immigration judge made a decision

§ 1231(a)(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien”). See Padilla-Ramirez, 862
F.3d at 884 (stating that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) provides for “mandatory detention during . . . [the] ninety-day
‘removal period’”).
80
§ 1231(a)(6).
81
Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 883.
82
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Lara Domínguez et al., U.S. Detention and Removal of Asylum Seekers: An International Human Rights Law
Analysis, YALE L. SCH. 1, 3 (June 20, 2016),
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that no party appealed lasted an average of 114 days.88 The average proceeding increased to a
total of 301 days where either party appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and
increased to 447 days where the BIA remanded to the immigration judge to render a final
decision.89 Thus, a noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order faces the prospect of being
detained for a long period of time in subpar conditions while his or her proceedings are ongoing.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that noncitizens subject to such proceedings do apply for bond
hearings to avoid detention altogether.90 The bond hearings, however, will not be available for
noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a).91 For this reason, the Ninth and
Second Circuits’ decisions regarding which detention provision applies to noncitizens during
withholding-only proceedings has great implications for numerous noncitizens.
II.

Part II: The Circuit Split Regarding the Administrative Finality of Reinstated
Removal Orders During Withholding-Only Proceedings

Part II(A): The Argument Against Administrative Finality
In 2016, the Second Circuit, in Guerra v. Shanahan, became the first appellate court to
issue an opinion on whether a noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order should be
mandatorily detained.92 In Guerra, the petitioner was a Guatemalan citizen who illegally entered
the United States in 1998 and was ordered removed later that year.93 He was officially removed
from the country in 2009.94 Thereafter, Guerra reentered the country illegally and was detained
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by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE) in 2014.95 After he was arrested, Guerra’s
1998 order removing him to Guatemala was reinstated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).96
Upon apprehension, Guerra asserted that he feared returning to Guatemala.97 An asylum
officer concluded that his fear was reasonable, and Guerra was placed in withholding-only
proceedings where he applied for statutory withholding of removal pursuant to § 1231(b)(3) and
relief under the CAT.98 Since Guerra was detained throughout his proceedings, he sought a writ
of habeas corpus, arguing that he was detained under § 1226(a).99 In response, the government
argued that Guerra’s detention was governed by § 1231(a).100 The court first noted how
noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders generally cannot apply for any relief under the
INA.101 The court then pointed to an exception to this rule; namely that the noncitizen may
apply for withholding of removal and/or relief under the CAT if he or she has a reasonable fear
of persecution or torture in the country listed in his or her removal order.102
The Second Circuit began its analysis by comparing §§ 1226(a) and 1231(a), noting how
§1226(a) governs when a decision is being made as to whether a noncitizen will be removed
from the United States.103 The court then stated that §1226(a) gives the government discretion in
electing to detain a noncitizen and also allows a noncitizen to request a bond hearing if the
government detains him or her.104 The Second Circuit then discussed § 1231(a) and noted how
its provisions apply to aliens subject to final removal orders.105 Therefore, the Second Circuit
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opined, § 1231(a)’s provisions can apply only if the reinstated removal order is “administratively
final.”106 Thus, the Second Circuit considered whether a reinstated removal order is
administratively final when a noncitizen is subject to withholding-only proceedings.107
The court first held that, based on § 1226(a)’s text, its provisions apply to noncitizens
involved in withholding-only proceedings.108 The court’s reasoning, however, was brief, as it
simply concluded that §1226(a) applies because withholding-only proceedings solely purport to
determine whether “‘the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.’”109 The court
did, however, find additional support for its holding through its analysis of the structures of both
§ 1226(a) and § 1231(a).110 The court also found support for its conclusion by analyzing its
precedent.111 The court first pointed to its decision in Kanacevic v. INS, where it held that
denying a noncitizen asylum in asylum-only proceedings “is judicially reviewable” even if no
final removal order is issued.112 The court’s rationale behind its decision in Kanacevic was that
denying a noncitizen asylum is “the functional equivalent of a removal order.”113 Thus, by
relying on this decision in the context of withholding-only proceedings, the Second Circuit
suggested that denying a noncitizen “withholding in withholding-only proceedings is likewise
the ‘functional equivalent’ of a final removal order.”114 The court then pointed to its decision in
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Chupina v. Holder, where it held that a removal order cannot be final if the BIA remands a
noncitizen’s case back to an immigration judge to determine his or her withholding-only claims,
suggesting that withholding-only proceedings disrupt a removal order’s finality.115
The government sought to distinguish the precedent the Second Circuit relied on in
reaching its decision by arguing that finality for purposes of § 1231(a) detention is different from
finality for purposes of judicial review.116 The court concluded its analysis by rejecting this
argument due to a lack of precedent supporting it and because the argument conflicted with the
notion that, for an agency’s action to be administratively final, there must be no future decisions
to be made by that agency.117
When ruling in Guerra’s favor, the Second Circuit focused primarily on whether
withholding-only proceedings involved a decision to remove an alien from the United States.118
The Second Circuit also opined that a reinstated removal order cannot be final removal order
during withholding-only proceedings because the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” has not yet occurred.119 The District Court of New Jersey’s decision in
Guerrero v. Aviles offers further support for the conclusion that reinstated removal orders are not
administratively final during withholding-only proceedings.120 Guerrero involved Nery Flores
Guerrero, a Honduran citizen who was removed to Honduras after an immigration judge ordered
him removed in 1999.121 After re-entering the country illegally, Guerrero was detained in 2014,
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was later found to have expressed a reasonable fear of returning to Honduras, and was
subsequently scheduled for a November 2014 withholding of removal proceeding.122 Thus, the
District Court, like the Second Circuit, considered whether Guerrero’s reinstated removal order
was administratively final.123
The Guerrero Court first analyzed the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B),
which provides a definition on the finality of removal orders.124 The statutory text provides that
“removal orders become final upon the earlier of . . . (i) a determination by the [BIA] affirming
such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the [noncitizen] is permitted to seek
review of such order by the [BIA].”125 Based on this definition, the Guerrero Court concluded
that Guerrero’s reinstated removal order cannot be administratively final.126
The court first noted that, once the immigration judge issued his or her decision regarding
Guerrero’s withholding-only proceedings, Guerrero had the right to appeal the decision to the
BIA.127 The court then concluded that, because §1101(a)(47)(B)(ii) provides that a removal
order is final upon “the expiration of the period in which the [noncitizen] is permitted to seek
review” of the BIA’s order, the reinstated removal order could not be final since the BIA could
still review the immigration judge’s decision.128 The court then expressed constitutional
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concerns about ruling against Guerrero since doing so would prevent him from exercising his
right to have the BIA review the immigration judge’s decision.129
The government, in Guerrero, argued that the order was administratively final because §
1231(a)(5) specifically provides that the noncitizen subject to such an order may not receive “any
relief under this chapter.”130 The court, however, responded to this argument by pointing to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, which held that withholding-only
proceedings are exceptions to the bar to an noncitizen’s ability to seek relief.131 The government
then argued that the reinstated removal order is administratively final since withholding-only
proceedings are limited only to deciding whether a noncitizen should be removed to the country
listed on the reinstated removal order.132 The court also rejected this argument, pointing again to
the fact that the order cannot be administratively final when the noncitizen has the right to appeal
the immigration judge’s decision to the BIA.133 The court then acknowledged Supreme Court
precedent, and precedent from other circuits, supporting its conclusion that the order was not
final.134
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Part II(B): The Argument For Administrative Finality
The cases that have analyzed the issue thus far have offered various reasons as to why the
orders are not administratively final, with the two primary reasons being that withholding-only
proceedings solely involve decisions concerning a noncitizen’s removal from the country and
that the INA’s definition of finality dictates that the orders are not administratively final.135
Despite the courts’ reasoning, the Ninth Circuit, in Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, rendered a decision
holding otherwise.136 In Padilla-Ramirez, a previously removed noncitizen was found to have
had a reasonable fear of returning to El Salvador after he was detained for reentering the country
illegally.137 Like the previously mentioned petitioners, Padilla was subject to a reinstated
removal order and was challenging his detention after he was granted the opportunity to pursue
relief through withholding-only proceedings.138
At the outset of its analysis, the court noted that during the withholding-only proceedings,
there is no judicial review of the reinstated removal order itself – thus, the status of that original
removal order is not subject to change.139 The court then analyzed the text of § 1231(a)(5),
which, according to the court, “indicate[d], in two ways, that a reinstated removal order is
administratively final.”140 First, the court highlighted the fact that removal orders are final upon
their initial execution.141 Thus, when an original removal order is executed, as it was in Padilla’s
case when he was first removed, that order becomes final.142 The court reasoned that, if a final
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removal order is reinstated, and the status of that order cannot change, as is required by §
1231(a)(5), then the reinstated removal order must also be final.143
Additionally, the court noted that § 1231(a)(5) is placed among the INA’s provisions
regarding mandatory detention of noncitizens, namely, § 1231(a).144 Thus, the court concluded
that Congress must have intended for detention of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal
orders to be governed by § 1231(a)’s provisions.145 The court also concluded that a noncitizen’s
ability to avoid removal through withholding-only proceedings do not affect its conclusion that
the reinstated removal order itself is administratively final.146
The court then distinguished its prior precedent where it held that the reinstated removal
orders were not final during withholding-only proceedings.147 In Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, a
noncitizen challenged a regulation preventing him from applying for asylum during his
withholding-only proceedings.148 While the Ortiz-Alfaro court held that the reinstated removal
order was not final during the proceedings, the Padilla-Ramirez court noted that Ortiz-Alfaro is
distinguishable.149 In Ayala v. Sessions, an asylum officer found that a noncitizen did not have a
reasonable fear of returning to Guatemala, which an immigration judge affirmed.150 The
immigration judge then denied that noncitizen’s motion to reconsider that decision, which was a
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final order unless appealed to the BIA within thirty days.151 The noncitizen filed an appeal
within the thirty day timeframe, but the BIA held that it could not consider her appeal because it
lacked jurisdiction.152 The noncitizen then filed a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit.153
The Padilla-Ramirez court, however, distinguished its decision in Ayala on the basis that, like in
Ortiz-Alfaro, its decision rested on the canon of constitutional avoidance.154
The Court concluded its analysis by critiquing the Second Circuit’s analysis of this issue
in Guerra v. Shanahan.155 The Court first opined that the Second Circuit was incorrect in
concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a) applies because withholding-only proceedings only involve a
decision of what country a noncitizen will be removed to.156 The Court noted that the decision to
remove the noncitizen was already made, and the only decision being made during withholdingonly proceedings is what country he or she will be removed to.157 The court then critiqued the
Second Circuit’s reliance on Kanacevic v. INS.158 Specifically, the court noted how asylum-only
proceedings and withholding-only proceedings are different, and thus, relying on precedent
regarding asylum-only proceedings was inappropriate.159 The court also critiqued the Second
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Circuit’s reliance on Chupina v. Holder.160 The Court noted how Chupina “stands . . . for the . . .
proposition that a removal order does not become final . . . until all of an alien’s claims for relief
made during his original removal proceedings are resolved.”161 The court opined that this
proposition does not provide an answer for how a noncitizen’s new claim of relief, i.e. a claim
for relief through statutory withholding of removal or CAT, affects a final removal order that has
been reinstated and “immunized from reopening or review.”162 The Court also noted, as was
mentioned before, that the differences between finality for purposes of detention and judicial
review did not warrant the Second Circuit’s reliance on Chupina in reaching its decision.163 The
court’s last critique was that the Second Circuit inappropriately relied on administrative law
principles when it held that the orders cannot be final since agency’s actions are final only when
no agency decisions are left to be made.164 The court stressed that the Second Circuit incorrectly
applied this principle because a final decision has already been made that the petitioner was to be
removed from the country.165
Part III: The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Second Circuit’s Reasoning as it is Better
Aligned With Congress’s Intent to Protect Noncitizens Escaping Dangerous Conditions
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Padilla-Ramirez created a circuit split between the Ninth
and Second Circuits regarding the detention of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders
during withholding-only proceedings.166 Due to the split, whether or not a noncitizen subject to
a reinstated removal order will be detained during withholding-only proceedings largely depends
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on which jurisdiction he or she is in.167 In the event that the Supreme Court were to hold that the
Ninth Circuit erred in its holding, it would become clear that many noncitizens suffered injustice
by being detained when, legally, detention was not required. Thus, to avoid such injustice, the
Supreme Court should resolve the current split sooner rather than later, especially when one
considers the large number of noncitizens entering the country illegally each year who could
potentially become subject to the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous holding.168 In Part III of this
comment, I will argue that the Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning and
conclude that detention of aliens subject to reinstated removal orders is mandatory during
withholding-only proceedings.
First, it must be noted that the Supreme Court’s decision would certainly be a difficult
one, as the Ninth Circuit’s decision does have support. The crux of the Ninth Circuit’s holding is
that reinstated removal orders are final during withholding-only proceedings because
immigration judges are only deciding which country a noncitizen will be removed to during the
proceedings.169 The Ninth Circuit correctly notes that the primary issue during withholding-only
proceedings is whether the United States should remove the noncitizen to the country listed in
his or her removal order, as can be seen with his or her burden of proof in the proceedings.170
Moreover, the possibility that a noncitizen can be removed to a third country if his or her fear in
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the proposed country is reasonable lends further support to the fact that withholding-only
proceedings are concerned with which country the noncitizen will be removed to and not with
whether the noncitizen can remain in the United States.171 The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion also
has support in § 1231(a)(5)’s text, which provides that the noncitizen’s prior removal order is not
subject to review.172 Thus, if the previous order cannot be subsequently changed, the Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion that it retains its finality is logical.173
From a practical standpoint, however, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the reinstated
removal order remains final during withholding-only proceedings is false. The effect of the prior
removal order is that the noncitizen must be removed to the country listed in that order.174 Thus,
for withholding-only proceedings to not disturb the finality of the order, it must be that the
proceedings cannot impact the noncitizen’s country of removal. Withholding-only proceedings,
however, do alter the country of removal, albeit not often.175 For example, if a noncitizen is
granted relief through withholding-only proceedings, he or she may either remain in the United
States or be removed to a third country.176 In either case, the prior removal order’s finality was
affected because previously designated country of removal is no longer the country where the
noncitizen ultimately remains. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that the underlying removal
order cannot be altered is flawed from a practical standpoint.177
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Despite this flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the Supreme Court should ultimately
adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Guerra because it is better aligned with Congress’s
intent to protect noncitizens escaping dangerous conditions in their home countries. After World
War II concluded, the world bore witness to a “plight of refugees” seeking to escape dangerous
conditions in their home countries.178 Countries all over the world sought to address the large
numbers of people seeking residence in new nations, which led to the Convention’s adoption in
1951, which the United States assisted in drafting.179 The Convention was eventually amended
by the Protocol, which largely adopted the Convention’s provisions, while at the same time
expanding the range of individuals who can seek relief under the treaty.180 When the United
States became bound by the Protocol in 1968 and later amended its immigration laws through the
Refugee Act of 1980, the country became barred from removing noncitizens to countries where
they fear for their lives.181 The United States became further involved in efforts to assist
noncitizens escaping dangerous conditions in their home countries when it became bound by the
CAT in 1994.182
The United States’s international law obligations, as well as its reforms to its immigration
laws, reflect its intent to assist those who enter the United States looking to escape dangerous
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conditions in their countries. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that noncitizens subject
to reinstated removal orders are subject to mandatory detention during withholding-only
proceedings runs counter to this intent.183 First, as scholars have noted, the United States’s
detention facilities have subpar conditions, usually resembling those found in prisons.184
Moreover, scholars have also noted that detaining noncitizens directly counters the Convention’s
requirement that its participating nations do not penalize asylum seekers for entering the country
illegally.185 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that noncitizens are subject to mandatory
detention runs counter to Congress’s intent in two aspects. First, subjecting noncitizens who
seek refuge to mandatory detention in such facilities, and therefore treating them as prisoners,
cannot be squared with Congress’s intent to protect the noncitizens. In fact, subjecting them to
mandatory detention for attempting to find refuge closely resembles a penalty for the refugee’s
“unauthorized entry” into the United States, which is barred by the Convention.186 Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit’s holding runs counter to Congress’s intent to protect refugees because it
results in noncitizens being treated as prisoners for seeking refuge, which in turn penalizes them
for seeking refuge in the United States.187
The Second Circuit’s conclusion is also supported by Supreme Court precedent. In 2001,
the Supreme Court decided Zadvydas v. Davis, which concerned the prolonged detention of
noncitizens past the expiration of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)’s removal period.188 While the decision
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was rendered in a different context, the Supreme Court’s reasoning offers insight as to how the
Court would likely resolve the circuit split. Zadvydas involved the petitions of two noncitizens
subject to mandatory detention due to their criminal records.189 After they were detained and
placed in removal proceedings, both noncitizens were ordered removed from the United
States.190 Issues regarding their removal arose, however, when there was a lack of any countries
willing to accept either alien.191 The difficulty in locating a country of removal led to their
prolonged detention, prompting them to challenge their detention before the Supreme Court.192
While the INA does allow for criminal noncitizens to be detained beyond the ninety day removal
period provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the Court noted that the noncitizens cannot be
detained forever.193 After considering numerous factors, including the statute’s text, its
legislative history and the requirements of similar statutes, the Court ultimately held that the
detention of the noncitizens beyond the expiration of this removal period could only be for a
period that is “reasonably necessary to bring about [his or her] removal from the United
States.”194 The Court thereafter considered how long a noncitizen’s detention beyond the
expiration of the removal period should be, and ultimately determined that six months was a
reasonable detention period.195 In setting this time period, the Court emphasized that the
reasonableness of the “post removal period detention” was contingent upon whether the
noncitizen’s removal from the United States was “reasonably foreseeable.”196
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In Zadvydas, the Court expressed its concern with the possibility that noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention could be detained for prolonged periods of time.197 This concern, of
course, is what prompted the Court to conclude that detention is permissible so long as a
noncitizen’s removal is reasonably foreseeable.198 The Court’s emphasis on detention being
permissible so long as removal is reasonably foreseeable supports the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that mandatory detention is impermissible. First, it must be noted that noncitizens
will be removed from the country in a majority of withholding-only proceedings.199 Therefore, it
can be argued that, from the outset, the high likelihood of a noncitizen’s removal makes it
reasonably foreseeable that he or she will be removed from the United States. This argument,
however, fails to consider the length of time of withholding-only proceedings.200 On average,
withholding-only proceedings before an immigration last an average of four months.201 The
average proceeding, however, skyrockets to ten months when a noncitizen appeals an
immigration judge’s decision, and can be as high as fifteen months when the BIA remands a
decision back to an immigration judge for further proceedings.202 Moreover, it must be noted
that these averages reflect the detention period during the pendency of a noncitizen’s
withholding-only case.203 Since the averages do not reflect “the time [noncitizens] spent in
detention pending a reasonable fear determination,” the length of detention is usually much
longer.204 Thus, if detention is permissible so long as a noncitizen’s removal is “reasonably
foreseeable,” mandatory detention cannot be permissible when withholding-only proceedings
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could very likely extend for very long periods of time.205 The Ninth Circuit’s decision to
mandatorily detain noncitizens therefore runs counter to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Zadvydas v. Davis that detention is permissible so long as the noncitizen’s removal is reasonably
foreseeable.206 Therefore, the Supreme Court is more likely to adopt the Second Circuit’s
holding if it were to reach this issue on appeal.
Conclusion
The current split between the Ninth and Second Circuit will have many negative
implications and will impact numerous noncitizens if the Supreme Court does not act soon to
resolve it. Currently, a noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order will be mandatorily
detained if a Ninth Circuit court has jurisdiction over his or her case.207 Therefore, the
noncitizen will be subject to detention in subpar conditions for a prolonged period of time while
his or her withholding-only proceedings are ongoing.208 This, of course, clearly runs counter to
Congress’s intent to protect noncitizens seeking refuge and is also inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis. Thus, the Supreme Court should quickly act to resolve
the circuit split and adopt the Second Circuit’s holding. In doing so, the ultimate goal behind
withholding-only proceedings, which is to protect noncitizens fearing a return to their countries,
will best be served, and the injustice behind mandatory detention of noncitizens will be
avoided.209
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“[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture”).
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